Wink: Deniable Secure Messaging

End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging is an essential first step towards combating increasingly privacy-intrusive laws. Unfortunately, it is vulnerable to compelled key disclosure -- law-mandated, coerced, or simply by device compromise. This work introduces Wink, the first plausibly-deniable messaging system protecting message confidentiality even when users are coerced to hand over keys/passwords. Wink can surreptitiously inject hidden messages in the standard random coins (e.g., salt, IVs) used by existing E2EE protocols. It does so as part of legitimate secure cryptographic functionality deployed inside widely-available trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as TrustZone. This provides a powerful mechanism for hidden untraceable communication using virtually unchanged unsuspecting existing E2EE messaging apps, as well as strong plausible deniability. Wink has been demonstrated with multiple existing E2EE applications (including Telegram and Signal) with minimal (external) instrumentation, negligible overheads, and crucially without changing on-wire message formats